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Abstract—We report on the results of a measurement study
carried out on a commuter bus in Dublin, Ireland using the
Google/Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) API. This API is
likely to be widely used by Covid-19 contact tracing apps. Mea-
surements were collected between 60 pairs of handset locations
and are publicly available. We find that the attenuation level
reported by the GAEN API need not increase with distance
between handsets, consistent with there being a complex radio
environment inside a bus caused by the metal-rich environment.
Changing the people holding a pair of handsets, with the
location of the handsets otherwise remaining unchanged, can
cause variations of ±10dB in the attenuation level reported by
the GAEN API. Applying the rule used by the Swiss Covid-19
contact tracing app to trigger an exposure notification to our
bus measurements we find that no exposure notifications would
have been triggered despite the fact that all pairs of handsets
were within 2m of one another for at least 15 mins. Applying
an alternative threshold-based exposure notification rule can
somewhat improve performance to a detection rate of 5% when
an exposure duration threshold of 15 minutes is used, increasing
to 8% when the exposure duration threshold is reduced to 10
mins. Stratifying the data by distance between pairs of handsets
indicates that there is only a weak dependence of detection rate
on distance.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is currently a great deal of interest in the use of mobile
apps to facilitate Covid-19 contact tracing. This is motivated
by the hope that more efficient and scalable contact tracing
might allow the lockdown measures in place in many countries
to be relaxed more quickly [1] and that these systems can help
“hedge” against the risk of a second wave of the pandemic [2].
In early April 2020, Apple and Google formed a partnership
to develop contact event detection based on Bluetooth LE [3].
Following public launch of the Google/Apple Exposure Noti-
fication (GAEN) API on 20 May [4], GAEN implementations
are now installed on many people’s phones and this API is
likely to be widely used by national health authority contact
tracing apps.
The basic idea of a contact tracing app is that if two people
carrying mobile handsets installed with the app spend signifi-
cant time in close proximity to one another (e.g. spending 15
minutes within 2 metres) then the apps on their handsets will
both record this contact event. If, subsequently, one of these
people is diagnosed with Covid-19 then the contact events
logged on that person’s handset in the recent past, e.g. over
the last two weeks, are used to identify people who have been
in close contact with the infected person. These people might
then be made aware of the contact and advised to self-isolate
or take other appropriate precautions. For this approach to be
effective it is, of course, necessary that the app can accurately
detect contact events.
Almost all modern handsets are equipped with Bluetooth LE
wireless technology and this is used by the GAEN API as the
means for detecting contact events. In general, a radio signal
tends to get weaker as it gets further from the transmitter since
the transmit power is spread over a greater area. Bluetooth
LE devices can be configured to transmit beacons at regular
intervals and the idea is that the signal strength with which a
beacon is received provides a rough measure of the distance
between transmitter and receiver. Namely, when the received
signal strength is sufficiently high then this may indicate
a contact event and, conversely, when the received signal
strength is sufficiently low then this may indicate that the
handsets are not in close proximity.
However, the propagation of radio signals in practice is
often complex, especially in indoor environments where walls,
floors, ceiling, furniture etc can absorb/reflect radio waves and
so change the received signal strength. A person’s body also
absorbs Bluetooth LE radio signals so that the received signal
strength can be substantially reduced if their body lies on the
path between the transmitter and receiver.
A key difficulty in evaluating proximity detection accuracy in
real-world settings is establishing ground truth i.e. recording
when contact events actually happened. This ground truth is
needed so that the contact events flagged by a contact tracing
app can be compared against the actual contact events and
so allow the accuracy of the app at detecting contact events
to be assessed. Following [5], to address this we adopt a
scenario-based approach in which the ground truth is clear (to
within experimental error). The disadvantage is that this limits
study to fairly simple, well structured scenarios. However,
by selecting scenarios that aim to capture some of the key
elements in common activities we can still gain useful insight
into the real-world performance of Bluetooth LE received
signal strength for proximity detection.
In this paper we report on the results of a measurement
study carried out on a commuter bus in Dublin, Ireland. The
bus is of a standard double-decker design widely used in
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2Ireland and the UK. Measurements were collected between 60
pairs of handset locations and we have made those publicly
available [6]. Contact tracing apps will likely be used as an
adjunct to existing manual contact tracing and test systems.
These manual systems can usually readily identify the people
with whom an infected person share accommodation and with
work colleagues with whom the infected person is in regular
contact. More difficult is to identify people travelling on public
transport with whom an infected person has been in contact,
since the identities of these people are usually not known to
the infected person and are generally not otherwise recorded.
Public transport is therefore potentially an important use case
where effective contact tracing apps may be of significant
assistance in infection control.
In summary, our measurements indicate that radio signal prop-
agation is highly complex within the bus used, and in particular
the attenuation levels reported by the GAEN API need not
increase with distance. This is likely due to reflections from
the metal walls, floor and ceiling within the bus, metal being
known to be a strong reflector of radio signals. We observe
that changing the people holding a pair of handsets, with the
location of the handsets otherwise remaining unchanged, can
cause variations of ±10dB in the attenuation level reported by
the GAEN API.
The GAEN API is intended for use by health authority Covid-
19 contact tracing apps. Switzerland, for example, deployed a
Covid-19 contact tracing app based on the GAEN API on 26
May 2020 [7]. Applying the rule [8] which that app uses to
trigger an exposure notification to our bus measurements we
find that no exposure notifications would have been triggered.
This is despite the fact that in our measurements all pairs
of handsets were within 2m of one another for at least 15
minutes (the case requirement of the Swiss app, and others).
We also applied an alternative threshold rule for triggering
exposure notifications to our dataset, similar to current GAEN
guidelines. We find that attenuation level thresholds of up to
70dB (a high level, that previous measurements indicate would
be likely to trigger false alarms in outside environments [5])
the detection rate is at most 5% when an exposure duration
threshold of 15 minutes is used, increasing to 8% when the
exposure duration threshold is reduced to 10 mins. Stratifying
the data by distance between pairs of handsets indicates that
there is only a weak dependence of detection rate on distance,
consistent with the complex nature of the radio environment
already noted.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Brief Overview of Bluetooth LE
Bluetooth Low Energy (LE) was standardised in 2010. The
low energy moniker refers to the reduced drain on the device
battery compared to the older Bluetooth Classic technology.
The first mobile handsets using Bluetooth LE appeared in
2011-12 (e.g. the iPhone 4S) and today almost all modern
handsets come equipped with it.
Bluetooth LE operates in the same 2.4GHz unlicensed radio
band as WiFi and other devices (including microwave ovens).
Bluetooth LE devices advertise their presence by periodically
(typically once per second) broadcasting short beacon mes-
sages. To mitigate the effects of interference from other users
of the 2.4GHz band beacons are broadcast on three widely
spaced radio channels.
Each beacon essentially consists of a short fixed preamble,
followed by a small beacon payload. The payload contains
an identifier of the device making the broadcast (in modern
devices this identifier is usually randomised and changes
frequently to improve privacy) plus a short message (generally
up to 31 bytes long). This message is typically used to indicate
that the beacon is associated with a particular app or service,
e.g. to associate it with a contact tracing app.
A device equipped with a Bluetooth LE receiver scans the
three beacon radio channels listening for beacon transmissions.
When the start of a transmission is detected the receiver uses
the fact that the beacon preamble is fixed and known to fine
tune the radio receiver to the incoming signal. As part of
this fine tuning process a received signal strength indicator
(RSSI) is output, which is an estimate of the radio power in
the received signal. If the received signal strength is too weak
either the transmission is simply not noticed or this fine-tuning
process fails. Typically this occurs when the received signal
strength is below around -90dB to -100dB (the noise floor
of the receiver). Upon successful fine-tuning of the receiver
the payload of the beacon is decoded and passed up to the
operating system and then on to relevant apps.
The received signal strength is affected by the transmit power
used by the device broadcasting the beacon. Bluetooth LE
devices generally use a relatively low transmit power (to save
on battery drain) and a rough guideline is that beacons cannot
be decoded at distances beyond about 5-10 metres from the
transmitter. In practice the received signal strength is, however,
also greatly affected by the way in which the radio signal
propagates from transmitter to receiver. In general the radio
signal gets weaker as it travels further since the transmit
power is spread over a greater area. However, many complex
effects can be superimposed upon this basic behaviour. In
particular, obstacles lying on the path between the transmitter
and receiver (furniture, walls etc) can absorb and/or reflect the
radio signal and cause it to be received with higher or lower
signal strength. A person’s body also absorbs radio signals in
the 2.4 GHz band and so the received signal strength can be
substantially reduced if their body lies on the path between
the transmitter and receiver. In indoor environments walls,
floors and ceilings can reflect radio signals even when they
are not on the direct path between transmitter and receiver,
and so increase or decrease the received signal strength. See,
for example, [5] for measurements illustrating such effects in
real environments.
Metal, in particular, strongly reflects radio waves and this can
be an important factor in radio propagation in environments
with a lot of metal. In buses the walls, floor and ceiling are
mainly metal and the seats often contain metal parts. We can
3therefore expect that radio propagation in these environments
will be complex, and in particular due to reflections the signal
strength may not decrease as quickly with distance as in other
environments e.g. see [9], [10].
B. GAEN API
Use of the GAEN API is limited by Google to health authority
apps or to handsets registered with a limited set of gmail
accounts included on a whitelist maintained by Google. The
GAEN system is closed-source, and the available documen-
tation provides few details as to its internal operation. The
main focus of the GAEN system documentation is instead on
the specification two interfaces, which we summarise below.
See the GAEN documentation [11] and the recent independent
analysis in [12] for further details.
1) Bluetooth Beacon Format: The first interface specified
is the format to be used for Bluetooth LE beacons to en-
sure interoperability between handsets, in particular between
handsets running Apple’s iOS operating system and handsets
running Google’s Android operating system. In summary, each
handset generates a random Temporary Exposure Key (TEK)
once a day. This TEK is then used to generate a sequence
of Rolling Proximity Identifiers (RPIs), approximately one
for each 10 minute interval during the day (so around 144
RPIs are generated). The GAEN system running on a handset
transmits beacons roughly every 250ms. Each beacon contains
the current RPI value. Approximately every 10 minutes the
beacons are updated to transmit the next RPI value. By
constantly changing the content of beacons in this way the
privacy of the system is improved. In addition to the RPI
each beacon also carries encrypted metadata containing the
wireless transmit power level used. Although beacons are
emitted roughly every 250ms, on the receiving side, devices
only scan for beacons roughly every 4 minutes.
2) Query Interface: The second interface is between the
GAEN system running on a handset and apps running on the
same handset. This interface allows apps to submit a request
that includes an Exposure Configuration data structure to the
GAEN system [11]. The Exposure Configuration data structure
allows specification of the TEK to be queried, the start time
and duration of the interval of interest (specified in 10 minute
intervals since 1st Jan 1970) and a low and high attenuation
threshold (specified in dB). The GAEN system responds with
one or more Exposure Information data structures that report
an exposure duration (field durationMinutes) and an array
with three atttenuation duration values, giving the duration (in
minutes) that the attenuation level is below the low threshold,
the duration the attenuation level is between the low and high
thresholds and the duration above the high threshold. It is also
possible to query for an Exposure Summary response, but we
did not make use of this since the relevant information that
this contains can be derived from the Exposure Information
reports.
The GAEN documentation does not precisely state how the
attenuation level is calculated, nor does it give details as
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) Bus on which measurements were collected. (b)
Relative positions of participants during tests.
to how the attenuation duration is calculated. The analysis
in [12] deduces that the attenuation level is calculated as
PTX − PRX , where PTX is the transmit power level sent
in the beacon metadata and PRX is given by the filtered RSSI
plus a calibration value.
We also note the same analysis indicates that the GAEN API
uses a filtered RSSI value when calculating attenuation levels
and durations [12]. Namely, for Google Pixel 2 handsets (and
others) the RSSI is recorded only from beacons transmitted
on one of the three radio channels used by Bluetooth LE for
transmitting beacons.
C. Android Bluetooth LE Scanner API
The Android operating system includes a standard Bluetooth
LE Scanner API. Any app with the appropriate permissions
can access this API, unlike the GAEN API. The scanner API
can be configured to report an RSSI value for all beacons
received by a handset.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Experimental Protocol
Our experimental measurements were collected on a standard
double-decker bus used to carry commuters in Dublin, Ireland,
see Figure 1(a). We recruited five participants and gave each
of them Google Pixel 2 handsets. We asked them to sit in the
relative positions shown in Figure 1(b). This positioning aims
to mimic passengers respecting the relaxed social distancing
rules likely during easing of lockdown (where a minimum of
2m distancing is mandated). Each experiment is 15 minutes
duration giving around 3 scans by the GAEN API when scans
are made every 4 mins. A Wifi hotspot was set up on the
bus and the participants were asked to hold the handset in
their hand and use it for normal commuter activities such as
browsing the internet.
The first experiment was carried out on the lower deck of the
bus, participants were then asked to switch seats (they chose
seats themselves) and a second 15 minute experiment run.
With a mix of three participants from the first two experiments
and two new participants these experiments were then repeated
on the upper deck of the bus.
4Each handset had the GAEN API and a modified version of the
Google exemplar Exposure Notification app [13] installed, and
was registered to a gmail user included on the Google GAEN
whitelist so as to allow use of the GAEN API by the Exposure
Notification app. Each handset also had a GAENAdvertiser
app developed by the authors installed. This app implements
the transmitter side of the GAEN API and allowed us to
control the TEK used and also to start/stop the broadcasting
of Bluetooth LE beacons.
At the start of each 15 minute experiment participants were
asked to configure the GAENAdvertiser app with a new TEK
and then to instruct the app to start broadcasting GAEN
beacons. At the end of the experiment participants instructed
the GAENAdvertiser to stop broadcasting beacons. In this
way a unique TEK is associated with each handset in each
experiment, and these can be used to query GAEN API to
obtain separate exposure information reports for each handset
in each experiment.
Following all four experiments the handsets were collected,
the TEKs used by each handset extracted and the GAEN
API on each then queried for exposure information relating
to the TEKs of the other handsets. At the start of the fourth
experiment one participant exited the test. In total, therefore,
from these experiments we collected GAEN API reports on
Bluetooth LE beacon transmissions between 120 pairs of
handset locations. Since the radio transmission path between
two handsets symmetric, this yields 60 unique pairs of handset
locations. This measurement data is publicly available [6].
To provide baseline data on the radio propagation environment
we also used the standard Android Bluetooth LE scanner API
to collect measurements of RSSI as the distance was varied
between two Google Pixel 2 handsets placed at a height of
approximately 0.5m (about the same height as the bus seating)
in the centre aisle of the upper deck of the bus.
B. Ethical Approval
The experimental protocol was reviewed and approved by
the Ethics Committee of the School of Computer Science
and Statistics, Trinity College Dublin. The ethics application
reference number is 20200503.
C. Hardware & Software Used
We used five Google Pixel 2 handsets running GAEN API
version 2024900021. In a small number of measurements we
also used a Samsung Galaxy A10, and we indicate when this
is the case.
We used a version of the Google exemplar Exposure Notifi-
cation app modified to allow us to query the GAEN API over
USB using a python script (the source code for the modified
app is available on github [13]).
1As reported in the Settings-COVID 19 Notifications handset display.
In addition we also wrote our own GAENAdvertiser app that
implements the Bluetooth LE transmitter side of the GAEN
API. GAENAdvertiser allows us to control the TEK, and in
particular reset it to a new value at the start of each experiment.
In effect, resetting the TEK makes the handset appear as a
new device from the point of view of the GAEN API, and
so this allows us to easily collect clean data (the GAEN API
otherwise only resets the TEK on a handset once per day).
We carried out extensive tests running GAENAdvertiser and
the GAEN API on the same device to confirm that under a
wide range of conditions the responses of the GAEN API on
a second receiver handset were the same for beacons from
GAENAdvertiser and the GAEN API, see [12] for further
details.
GAENAdvertiser is open source and can be obtained by
contacting the authors (we have not made it publicly available,
however, since it can be used to facilitate a known replay attack
against the GAEN API [14]).
D. Querying the GAEN API
Repeated queries were made to the GAEN API holding the
low threshold constant at 48dB (which is lower than any
attenuation value seen in our experiments), and varying the
high threshold from 49dB to 100dB (in 1dB steps up to 80dB,
then in 5dB steps since noise tends to be higher at higher
attenuation levels). By differencing this sequence of reports
we infer the attenuation duration at each individual attenuation
level from 48dB through to 100dB.
We present the attenuation duration data obtained in this way
using a coloured heatmap. We split the range of attenuation
values shown on the y-axis into 2dB bins, i.e. 70-72dB, 72-
74dB and so on, up to 80dB when 5dB bins are thereafter used
since the data is noisier at these low signal levels. Within each
bin the colour indicates the percentage of the total duration
reported by the GAEN API that was spent in that bin, e.g
bright green indicates that more than 90% of the time was
spent in that bin. The mapping from colours to percentages is
shown on the righthand side of the plot. Bins with no entries
(i.e. with duration zero) are left blank. Where appropriate we
also include a solid line in plots that indicates the average
attenuation level at each transmit power level (the average is
calculated by weighting each attenuation level by the duration
at that level and then summing over all attenuation levels).
IV. RESULTS
A. Attenuation vs Distance
Figure 2(a) plots the attenuation measured between two hand-
sets placed at seat height in the aisle on the upper deck
of the bus as the distance between them is varied. These
measurements were taken using the standard Android Blue-
tooth LE scanner API (rather than the GAEN API). This
scanner API reports an RSSI value for each received beacon.
Following [12], for the Google Pixel 2 handsets used in our
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Fig. 2: (a) Measurements of attenuation between two handsets
as the distance between them is varied along the centre aisle
in the upper deck of the bus, (b) shows the setup used. The
vertical dashed lines indicate when the distance between the
handsets was changed, starting at 0.5m and then increasing by
0.5m at each step. The solid horizontal lines indicate the mean
attenuation level at each distance. Measurements taken using
the standard Android Bluetooth LE scanner API.
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Fig. 3: Attenuation durations reported by GAEN API on
completion of the first test on the lower deck of the bus.
experiments we map from RSSI to attenuation level using the
formula -17-(RSSI-4).
It can be seen that the attenuation initially increases as the
distance is increased from 0.5m to 1.5m, as might be expected.
But thereafter the attenuation level stays roughly constant with
increasing distance (sometimes increasing a little, also some-
times decreasing with increasing distance). The attenuation is
around 75dB at 1.5m and also at 3.5m.
This attenuation behaviour is unusual since generally we
expect attenuation to increase with distance. The floor, ceiling
and walls (apart from the windows) of the bus are all made
of metal, which is highly reflective at radio frequencies. We
hypothesise that what is happening is that the Bluetooth radio
signals are repeatedly reflected from the floor/ceiling/walls
and, apart from the signal that escapes out the windows and
other smaller apertures, the radio energy is largely conserved
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(a)
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(b)
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(c)
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(d)
Fig. 4: Attenuation durations reported by GAEN API on
completion of the second lower deck test (with the same
participants as in the first test, but with their seating positions
swapped about). In (d) person 5 is using a Samsung Galaxy
A10 rather than a Google Pixel 2.
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Fig. 5: Attenuation durations reported by GAEN API on
completion of the first test on the upper deck of bus.
as signals travel through the bus. Whether this is the case or
not, however, these baseline measurements indicate that the
radio attenuation does not simply with the distance between
handsets and this observation is of course pertinent to the use
of attenuation level as a proxy for distance.
B. Attenuation Between Passengers
Figures 3 - 6 plot the exposure information between handsets
reported by the GAEN API for each of the four experiments
with seated participants.
6Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(a)
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(b)
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(c)
Pair of People
50
60
70
80
90
At
te
nu
at
io
n 
(dB
)
>0
20
40
60
80
100
D
ur
at
io
n 
(%
)
(d)
Fig. 6: Attenuation durations reported by GAEN API on
completion of the second upper deck test. Participant in seat
4 is absent for this test but otherwise the participants are
the same as in the first test, but with their seating positions
swapped about. We have kept the x-axis labelling the same as
in Figure 5 to facilitate comparison.
To assist with interpreting the plots the reports in each
plot are ordered by increasing distance between the pairs of
participants (see Figure 1(a)). It can be seen that there is
no consistent trend in the change in attenuation level with
increasing distance. Sometimes the attenuation increases with
increasing distance (as hoped for when used for proximity
detection) but frequently the attenuation level also falls with
increasing distance. This is consistent with the measurements
of attenuation vs distance reported in Section IV-A.
Figures 3 and 4 both show measurements taken on the
lower deck of the bus, but with participants having switched
seats between the two. This allows us to see the impact
of differences in the way that each participant uses their
handset. Comparing Figures 3 and 4 it can be seen that in
plots (b)-(d) the pattern of variation in attenuation is generally
similar although the attenuation level can vary substantially
with the attenuation level increasing by around 10dB between
Figures 3(b) and 4(b). Figures 3(a) and 4(a) differ both
qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the attenuation
between participants 1 and 4 increases by around 10dB from
Figure 3(a) to 4(a) and the attenuation between participants
1 and 2 decreases by around 10dB. It is difficult to attribute
these differences to specific causes, but they do highlight the
magnitude of the variation in attenuation that can be induced
by person-to-person variation.
Figures 5 and 6 show corresponding measurements taken on
the upper deck of the bus. As in the lower deck measurements
the general pattern of variation in attenuation is generally
similar but there can be changes of around 10dB in the
attenuation level, e.g. between participants 1 and 5 in Figures
5(a) and 6(a), and participants 2 and 3 in Figures 5(b) and
6(b).
C. Exposure Notification Error Rate
The GAEN API is intended for use by health authority Covid-
19 contact tracing apps. When a person is found to be infected
with Covid-19 the TEKs from their handset are uploaded
to a central server. The health authority app on another
person’s handset can then download these TEKs, generate the
corresponding RPIs (the values actually sent in beacons) and
compare these against the set of RPIs in beacons received by
the handset. If there is a match, the attenuation duration values
reported by the GAEN API can then be used to estimate the
risk of infection and trigger an exposure notification is this
risk is sufficiently high.
A typical requirement is for a person to have spent at least 15
minutes within 2m of the infected person in order to trigger an
exposure notification. The mapping from GAEN attenuation
durations to exposure notification is therefore largely based
on use of attenuation level as a proxy for proximity between
handsets.
1) Swiss DP-3T Exposure Notification Rule: Switzerland de-
ployed a Covid-19 contact tracing app based on the GAEN
API on 26 May 2020 [7]. The documentation for this app states
that it queries the GAEN API with low and high attenuation
thresholds of t1 = 50dB and t2 = 55dB and then bases
exposure notifications on the quantity ES = B1 + 0.5B2,
where B1 is the attenuation duration below 50dB reported by
the GAEN API and B2 is the attenuation duration between
50dB and t2 [8]. An exposure notification is triggered is ES
is greater than 15 mins.
With regard to the feasible range of values for t2, in [5]
measurements are given of RSSI vs distance for Pixel 2
handsets located in an open space outdoors. Mapping these
to GAEN attenuation levels at a distance of 2m the mean
attenuation level is 65dB. Use of t2 values significantly above
65dB therefore risks generating a significant number of false
positives when used in outdoor environments.
We applied this exposure notification rule to the GAEN
attenuation duration dataset reported in Section IV-B. In these
experiments all participants are seated within 2m of one
another for 15 minutes and so should trigger an exposure
notification. For the 60 pairs of handset locations in this dataset
Figure 7(a) plots the percentage of these pairs which would
trigger an exposure notification as threshold t2 is varied from
55dB upwards and the threshold for ES is varied from 5
minutes to 15 mins. The mean percentage is shown with one
standard deviation indicated by the error bars. The mean and
standard deviation are obtained by a standard bootstrapping
approach2
2The dataset was resampled with replacement n = 1000 times, the
exposure notification percentage calculated for each sample and then the mean
and standard deviation of these n estimates calculated. We selected n by
calculating the mean and standard deviation vs n and selecting a value large
enough that these were convergent.
755 60 65 70 75
t2 (dB)
0
20
40
60
80
D
et
ec
tio
ns
 (%
)
duration thresh 5 min
duration thresh 10 min
duration thresh 15 min
(a) Swiss EN Rule
55 60 65 70 75
Threshold (dB)
0
20
40
60
80
D
et
ec
tio
ns
 (%
)
duration thresh 5 min
duration thresh 10 min
duration thresh 15 min
(b) Threshold Rule
Fig. 7: Exposure notification rate obtained when applying a
range of exposure notification rules to the GAEN bus dataset.
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Fig. 8: Exposure notification rate broken down by distance be-
tween handsets for the GAEN bus dataset. Threshold exposure
notification rule, t2 value marked on x-axis, ES threshold 10
minutes.
It can be seen from Figure 7(a) that when t2 = 55dB
then no exposure notifications are triggered for any choice
of ES threshold. Indeed, when the ES threshold is 10 or
15 minutes no exposure notifications are triggered for any
choice of t2. With an ES threshold of 5 minutes the rate of
exposure notifications increases with t2, as might be expected.
For t2 = 65dB the detection rate is 4%, rising to 11% for
t2 = 68dB and 31% for t2 = 70dB. An ES threshold of
only 5 minutes is, however, unrealistic when the medical case
requirement is 15 minutes and, as noted above, t2 values
significantly above 65dB risk generating false positives in
outdoor environments.
2) Threshold-Based Exposure Notification Rule: We also con-
sider the alternative approach of triggering an exposure notifi-
cation whenever the attenuation duration is above threshold t2
i.e. without the weighting of 0.5 used in the Swiss exposure
notification rule. For this exposure notification rule Figure 7(b)
plots the percentage of exposure notifications as threshold t2 is
varied from 55dB upwards and the threshold for ES is varied
from 5 minutes to 15 minutes.
It can be seen from Figure 7(b) that for t2 = 65dB the
detection rate is 1% when the ES threshold is 15 minutes,
1.5% for a 10 minute threshold and 10% for an unrealistic
ES threshold of 5 minutes. Increasing t2 to 68dB the detection
rates become 3.5%, 6.5% and 28% respectively for thresholds
of 15, 10 and 5 minutes. For t2 equal to 70dB these figures
increase to 5%, 8% and 37%.
We also carried out a stratified analysis of exposure notification
rates broken down by the distance between handset pairs.
Figure 8(a) plots the relative frequencies of distances between
the handset pairs in the dataset. Figure 8(b) plots the exposure
detection rates vs t2 for handsets within 1m, 1.5m and 2m
of one another. The ES threshold is 10 minutes. It can be
seen that the mean detection rate is higher for handsets that
are less than 1m apart. However, for t2 values up to 70dB
the increase is not statistically significant. That is, distance
between handsets has only a weak, if any, correlation with
detection rate. Further measurements are needed to establish
the reason for this, but the baseline data in Figure 2(a) is
indicative of the complex radio environment.
V. DISCUSSION
A limitation of this study is that it is confined to handsets
using the Android operating system. The GAEN API is also
implemented on Apple iOS devices, but Apple have severely
limited the ability of testers to make measurements (each
handset is limited to querying the GAEN API a maximum
of 15 times a day, and Apple has no whitelisting process
to relax this constraint. Our measurement approach uses 34
queries to extract fine-grained attenuation data per pair of
phone locations).
We equipped participants with the same model of handset in
order to remove this as a source of variability in the data and
instead focus on variability caused by the radio environment
and the way that people hold their handsets. Google and
Apple are currently undertaking a measurement campaign
to select calibration values within the GAEN API with the
aim of compensating for differences between handset models.
We therefore expect that our measurements should also be
applicable to a range of handsets, although this remains to be
confirmed.
In our experiments we asked each participant to hold the
handset in their hand and use it as they usually would when
commuting. Our observations indicate that this is the common
case, but it means that we did not collect data for situations
where people have the phone in a pocket or bag. We leave
this data collection to future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
We report on the results of a measurement study carried out
on a commuter bus in Dublin, Ireland using the Google/Apple
Exposure Notification (GAEN) API. Measurements were col-
lected between 60 pairs of handset locations and are publicly
available. We find that the attenuation level reported by the
GAEN API need not increase with distance between handsets,
consistent with there being a complex radio environment inside
a bus caused by the metal-rich environment. Changing the
people holding a pair of handsets, with the location of the
handsets otherwise remaining unchanged, can cause variations
of ±10dB in the attenuation level reported by the GAEN
API. Applying the rule used by the Swiss Covid-19 contact
8tracing app to trigger an exposure notification to our bus
measurements we find that no exposure notifications would
have been triggered despite the fact that all pairs of handsets
were within 2m of one another for at least 15 minutes.
Applying an alternative threshold-based exposure notification
rule can somewhat improve performance to a detection rate
of 5% when an exposure duration threshold of 15 minutes is
used, increasing to 8% when the exposure duration threshold
is reduced to 10 minutes. Stratifying the data by distance
between pairs of handsets indicates that there is only a weak
dependence of detection rate on distance.
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